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1. Introduction 
Recent estimates suggest motor vehicle accidents cost the Australian economy around $17 
billion per year (Connelly, and Supangan, 2006). While both the number of crashes and crash 
rates (crashes/kilometre) has reduced dramatically in the last thirty years, latest statistics show 
that 1,463 persons were killed on Australian roads in 2008, with 395 killed in the state of New 
South Wales alone (Australian Government, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional 
Development and Local Government, 2009). More worryingly, it appears reductions may have 
stagnated in recent years, leaving policy-makers searching for other options that might lead to 
significant drops in crash rates. While engineering-based methods for both roadway 
infrastructure and vehicles, and regulation and enforcement will continue to play a critical role 
in future road-safety initiatives, an area of growing interest is the use of kilometre-based 
financial mechanisms to encourage safer  driving practices (Litman, 2009). The notion here is 
that by linking what motorists are charged not just to the kilometres they drive and the 
circumstances under which those kilometres are driven (e.g., night-time driving, route choice, 
speeding), motorists will be directly incentivised to change behaviour, reducing the overall risk 
and societal costs of accidents (Zantema et al., 2008). 
In 2009, an experiment was conducted in Sydney, Australia, which aimed to facilitate and detect 
changes in driving behaviour following the imposition of a kilometre-based charging regime 
focused around encouraging safer driving practices (Greaves et al. 2010). The charging regime 
was focused on reducing kilometres, night-time driving and speeding, all known correlates with 
increased crash-risk (Greaves and Fifer, 2010). The experiment involved a 10-week field study 
of 148 Sydney motorists in which driving patterns were monitored using Global Positioning 
System (GPS) technology before and after the implementation of the charging regime. Motorists 
were financially rewarded for any net reductions in vehicle kilometres of travel (VKT), night-
time driving, and speeding in the after period relative to the before period. The current paper 
reports on the main findings of the experiment, with the focus on aggregate-level change in 
VKT, night-time driving and speeding. These quantitative measures of changes are 
supplemented by the findings of exit interviews designed to find out more about the reasons 
lying behind observed changes. 
2. Literature review 
Efforts to financially incentivise safer on-road driving behaviour are most visible through 
commercial pay-as-you-drive (PAYD) insurance options, in which premiums are differentiated 
to kilometres driven and in some cases time, location and speed (Litman, 2009). Technology has 
facilitated even more sophisticated offerings focused on how a vehicle is being driven or Pay-
How-You-Drive (PHYD). For instance, the Co-operative Insurance company has recently 
launched a product that offers premium reductions for young drivers based on their braking and 
acceleration, cornering, speeding and time of driving1
                                                          
1 
. These behaviours are monitored via a 
‘Smartbox’, which transmits the information to a server that computes adjustments to the 
premiums based accordingly. Although not widely available in Australia as yet, PAYD schemes 
are available in various forms in the U.S., the UK, Australia and the Netherlands among others 
(Zantema et al., 2008). Commercial sensitivities (presumably) preclude details of how rates are 
set and while some aggregate indicators of the outcomes of the programs are provided, rarely is 
information provided on the before and after changes in driving. One exception to this was a 
recent government-sponsored trial of PAYD insurance in Dallas-Fort Worth (Reese and Pash-
Brimmer, 2009). Here, motorists were monitored for 12 months (divided into two six month 
periods) before and after the imposition of a distance-based scheme that rewarded them at 
$US25 for each 5% percent reduction in miles driven up to a cap of $350 ($175 per period). 
http://www.co-operativebank.co.uk/ 
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Various academic studies have focused on exploring how variable-rate pricing regimes might 
affect motorist behaviour, largely from the perspective of congestion-mitigation with few 
focusing on risk-reduction per se (Nielsen, 2004; Xu et al., 2009).  The closest parallel to the 
current investigation was by Zantema et al. (2008) through a hypothetical investigation of the 
effects of various PAYD insurance schemes being proposed for young drivers in the 
Netherlands. The approach used was to set a base rate, which in this case was taken as the 
average insurance premium divided by the annual kilometres driven. The base rate was then 
adjusted upwards by factors (derived from various sources) reflective of higher accident risk, 
including driving at night versus driving during the day and driving on urban roads versus 
motorways. They concluded that the most ‘aggressive’ scheme, comprising obligatory time and 
road type differentiation could reduce crashes by over five percent. No published evidence is 
currently available on how this changed behaviour in reality.  
Other studies have looked at specific methods of using financial mechanisms to change 
behaviour, primarily speeding. Mazureck and van Hatten (2006) detail a study in the 
Netherlands, in which motorists were paid to stay within the speed limit and maintain a safe 
following distance. Results indicated that speeding was reduced by around 20 percent based on 
a reward of 0.04 Euros for every 15 seconds spent not speeding – notably, once the rewards 
were removed, drivers largely reverted back to their original behaviour. In a similar study, the 
Swedish Intelligent Economic Speed Adaptation study involved directly linking incentives to 
actual speeding behaviour. In this study participants were paid a lump sum bonus and this bonus 
was reduced by a certain charge for every minute participants drove above the speed limit 
within the study period (Gunnar, 2009). 
3. Study methods 
While full details of the methods are provided in Greaves et al. (2010) and Greaves and Fifer 
(2011), for the benefit of the reader, the process is briefly described here. Motorists were 
recruited initially to undertake a ten week study of driving in Sydney involving both a GPS and 
online survey component for which they would receive a gift card worth AU$30. Note there was 
no mention of the potential to make money through changes in driving at the recruitment phase 
because of the potential for artificially influencing driving behaviour. The study encompassed 
five distinct phases: a five-week ‘before’ period of GPS monitoring (GPS ‘Before’), 
establishment of the charging regime, a stated choice survey completed at the end of the GPS 
‘Before’ phase (SC ‘Before’), a five-week ‘after’ period of GPS monitoring (GPS ‘After) and a 
stated choice survey completed at the end of the ‘After’ phase (SC ‘After) (see Figure 1). To 
cross-check the VKT coming from the GPS device, three odometer readings were also taken at 
installation, after the GPS ‘Before’ phase and at the completion of the GPS ‘After’ phase. 
Finally, exit interviews were completed to gather participant thoughts on both the survey itself 
as well as questions designed to gather further evidence on whether any observed changes in 
behaviour were due to the charges or other factors. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Study overview 
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The purpose of the five-week before period of GPS monitoring was to establish a detailed 
profile of driving routines and patterns. A website was developed enabling participants to view 
their travel and add trip-specific information (e.g., who was driving, trip purpose) via a Google-
map style interface developed by the project team. Concurrent with this was the development of 
the charging regime (Table 1), which was based on scientific (crash-cost and crash-risk 
analysis) as well as pragmatic (easily understandable, sufficient to encourage a change in 
behaviour, within the project budget) considerations (Greaves and Fifer, 2010). The information 
collected in the ‘before period’ was combined with the charging regime to establish a ‘budget’ 
for each motorist reflecting the combined effects of their kilometres driven, night-time driving 
and speeding. Motorists were then informed they could make money based on reductions in 
these measures relative to the before period. A further five week period of GPS monitoring (the 
GPS ‘After’ phase) followed to detect any changes made with participants notified on a daily 
basis via the website, how they were faring against the budget. At the end of the trial, 
participants received a financial payment corresponding to the money they had left – note, 
participants going over-budget were not obliged to pay.  
Table 1:  Final charging rates used in the GPS ‘after’ phase (Greaves and Fifer, 2010) 
Age-Group Day - Non Speeding Day - Speeding 
Night - Non 
Speeding Night - Speeding 
17-30 Male $0.20 $0.60 $0.80 $2.40 
17-30 Female $0.20 $0.60 $0.80 $2.40 
31-65 Male $0.15 $0.45 $0.60 $1.20 
31-65 Female $0.15 $0.45 $0.60 $1.20 
 
4. Recruitment and sample details 
Participants were recruited via an online panel according to strict criteria that reflected the main 
aims of the study as well as practicalities about using the GPS equipment. In terms of the main 
aims of the study, only participants with a valid license from one-car households were recruited2 
and they needed to be the primary driver and drive more than two days per week on average. In 
terms of practicalities, cars needed a working cigarette lighter, which did not stay on when the 
engine turned off and drain the battery (a problem for a small proportion of high-end vehicles in 
Australia) and parked off-street at night. Unfortunately, the parking criterion was imposed 
following the pilot study in which two devices were lost in the first week because they were in 
vehicles that were parked on-street that were stolen and later dumped3
The original sample comprised 148 motorists, of which 119 were given the charging regime (the 
target group) and 29 were not (the control group). Of the 148 participants who started the 
experiment, 125 completed all phases with 116/119 (97 percent) of target participants and 9/29 
(31 percent) of control participants complying respectively. Twelve dropped out due to loss of 
interest/fatigue (all in the control group) while two target group participants and four control 
group participants had incomplete prompted-recall data for the comparison time periods. 
Intuitively, the opportunity to make money kept the target participants interested while 
unfortunately control participants lost interest and motivation as the study extended well past 
the original ten weeks. In terms of other issues, despite incorporating screeners about the need 
for constant power from cigarettes lighters, three participants were still lost from the study due 
to this problem. Another two participants dropped out due to ‘computer issues’ meaning they 
could not visit the website. 
. 
                                                          
2 The proportions of one-car households in the selected suburbs were Chatswood (48%), Hurstville (46%), 
Parramatta (50%), Strathfield (35%), Randwick (51%) and Sutherland (52%). 
3These were the only two devices out of 150 that were lost in the entire study. 
Analysis of a financial incentive to encourage safer driving practices 
Greaves & Fifer 
 
4 
Due to the higher than anticipated loss of sample those participants with eligible before data 
were invited back for a further five-week phase of charging (Phase II) that ran from Monday 
February 22nd, 2010 to Sunday March 28th, 2010. These included participants lost because they 
took extended holidays in the after period and a number of drivers who had participated during 
pilot testing of the experiment earlier in the year. This resulted in another 17 participants in the 
target sample giving a net total of 133 (116 + 17) for further consideration. 
These 133 participants were then subjected to several data quality checks to verify to the 
maximum extent possible the changes were genuine. This resulted in the removal of 29 
participants due to un-reconcilable differences between the GPS-based VKT estimates and the 
odometer-based VKT readings (15 participants) and those taking extended holidays in the after 
period (14 participants). Two of those taking holidays were invited back, leaving a final usable 
sample of 106 participants for further analysis (Table 2). While these final numbers (particularly 
young males) may seem low, it must be stressed that they are reflective of the number of 
vehicles included in the sample, not the number of drivers. The issue here is that 54/106 
vehicles were in fact driven by more than one participant over the study period with a total pool 
of drivers of 181. While this captures the reality of what would happen if (say) a scheme of this 
nature were implemented, it is important to interpret results in this light. 
Table 2:  Final sample breakdown for analysis 
Original Target Sample + Phase II Sample 133 
Extended holiday in before or after period 14* 
Un-reconcilable differences in VKT 15 
Final Vehicle Sample for Before and After Analysis 106 
Demographics of Study Participant  
Male 17-30 years of age 5 
Male 31-45 years of age 19 
Male 46-65 years of age 20 
Female 17-30 years of age 21 
Female 31-45 years of age 24 
Female 46-65 years of age 17 
Vehicles with Multiple Drivers 54 
Total Drivers in the Sample 181 
*Two holiday participants completed the Phase II wave so are included in the 133. 
5. Results 
5.1 Aggregate comparisons 
Of the 106 participants/vehicles who qualified for the before and after comparison, sixty five 
(61 percent) made money, while 41 (39 percent) did not and received nothing (to reiterate what 
was stated earlier, they did not have to pay back the additional amount). For those making 
money, payouts ranged from $2 to $619 with an average payout of $116 (median payout was 
$77). A pertinent question is whether the amount of the starting budget had any influence on the 
propensity of change as logic might suggest someone would be more motivated by making 
several hundred dollars than a few dollars. When viewed overall, the answer appears to be yes, 
with those making money starting with an average budget of $350 compared to $240 for those 
not making money. However, the correlation between starting amount and final payout (r=0.59) 
suggests this use of averages may not be telling the full story. This is confirmed by Figure 2, 
which suggests considerable intra-participant variability with some participants on very high 
starting amounts making little or no money. The implications here are that participants were 
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varied both in their capability and willingness to make changes for financial rewards computed 
from their actual driving. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Comparison of starting amount and final payout by participant 
Table 3 provides the overall changes in key travel characteristics across the sampling period. 
The 95 percent confidence limit was constructed using the approach advocated by Stopher and 
Greaves (2006) for assessing the significance of changes in behaviour from panel data. VKT 
was reduced by 113.7 km or 3.2 km/day, an average reduction of 9.8 percent. However, the 
sample was evenly split by those who increased their VKT compared to those who decreased 
VKT. Night-time kilometres increased marginally in the after period but the changes were not 
statistically significant (p = 0.91), although half the sample reduced their night-time VKT. The 
number of kilometres spent speeding decreased by 64.8 km (1.9 km/day) with three-quarters of 
the sample reducing their speeding. Overall the proportion of distance speeding fell by 4.7%, 
which coupled with the decrease in VKT, meant the proportion of kilometres spent speeding in 
the after period fell by 41.8%. The number of trips also fell, from 142.2 (4.1 trips/day) to 129.8 
trips (3.7 trips/day), a reduction of 8.7 percent. Finally, the average time spent driving fell from 
around 62 minutes/day to 56 minutes/day, a drop of 9.7 percent. 
Table 3:  Overall change in travel characteristics between the five-week before and after periods 
n = 106 Before After Change 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Change 
Percent of 
Sample 
Reducing 
Average VKT 1,164.3 1,050.5 -113.7 (-9.8%) (p = 0.02) 
-160.0 (-14%) to 
-84.8 (-6%) 
50% 
Night-time 
VKT 
120.5 
(10.4%) 
121.7 
(11.6%) 
1.2 (1.0%) 
(p=0.91) 
-10.0 (-8%) to 
12.4 (10%) 
50% 
Speeding 
VKT 
155.0 
(13.3%) 
90.2 
(8.6%) 
-64.8 (-41.8%) 
(p = 0.00) 
-76.9 (-50%) to 
-52.8 (-34%) 
75% 
Trips 142.2 129.8 -12.4 (-8.7%) (p = 0.00) 
-16.7 (-12%) to 
-8.1 (-6%) 
61% 
Travel Time 
(mins) 
36:15:58 32:45:46 -03:30:12 (-9.7%) 
(p = 0.02) 
-04:57:31 (-14%) to 
-02:02:53 (-6%) 
47% 
*Paired sample t-test 
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5.1.1 VKT/trip purpose 
Analysing the changes in VKT by trip purpose (Table 4) shows that for work/work-related trips, 
VKT reduced by 10.5 percent, although this was not significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Half the sample reduced their work VKT, similar to the pattern for overall VKT. 
Shopping/personal business VKT marginally increased (not significant) while 
social/recreational VKT decreased by 17.6 percent (significant at the 95% confidence level). 
The results suggest that overall participants had most flexibility (not surprisingly) in reducing 
travel that might be considered more discretionary. Perhaps, more surprisingly is the lack of 
flexibility for shopping/personal business, suggesting that overall participants were 
unwilling/unable to change these patterns. 
Table 4:  Change in VKT/trip purpose 
VKT 
Purpose  
(n = 106) 
Before After Change 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Change 
Percent of 
Sample 
Reducing 
Work & 
Work-
Related 
324.4 
 
290.3 
 
-34.0 (-10.5%) 
(p=0.16) 
-58.1 (-18%) to 
-10.0 (-3%) 
50%* 
 
Shopping & 
Personal 
Business 
214.5 216.7 2.2 (1%) 
(p=0.87) 
-10.9 (-5%) to 
15.3 (7%) 
54% 
Social/ 
Recreational 
293.1 241.5 -51.6 (-17.6%) 
(p=0.02) 
-72.8 (-25%) to 
-30.3 (-10%) 
60% 
*12 participants recorded no work VKT in either the before or after phases, so this computation was based on the 94 
participants who did. 
5.1.2 Money makers 
Analysing the results for the 65 participants making money shows (as expected) more marked 
changes in VKT and speeding as well as a substantial and statistically significant decrease in 
night-time driving (Table 5). VKT decreased by around 26 percent with 82 percent of the 
sample reducing, while the distance spent speeding decreased by around 62 percent, with 92 
percent reducing.. 
Table 5:  Overall change in kilometres, night-time driving and speeding between the five-week before 
and after periods (those who made money only) 
n = 65 Before After Change 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Change 
Percent of 
Sample 
Reducing 
VKT 1288.3 951.0 -337 (-26.2%) (p = 0.00) 
-395.9 (-31%) to 
-278.5 (-22%) 
82% 
Night-time 
VKT 
148.1 
(11.5%) 
110.3 
(11.6%) 
-37.8 (-25.5%) 
(p = 0.00) 
-47.7 (-32%) to 
-27.9 (-19%) 
66% 
Speeding 
VKT 
168.7 
(13.1%) 
64.4 (6.8%) -104.3 (-61.8%) 
(p = 0.00) 
-121.1 (-72%) to 
-87.5 (-52%) 
92% 
5.1.3 Non-money makers 
Focusing on the 41 participants who did not make money, Table 6 shows that overall there was 
a 25 percent increase in VKT and all increased their VKT in the after period. Night-time driving 
also increased (substantially) for this group. Speeding decreased marginally, although the 
change was statistically insignificant. Interestingly, though almost half the sample reduced their 
speeding VKT, suggesting that (perhaps) simply being made aware that speeding was being 
monitored was in itself an important factor affecting behaviour. This assertion is currently being 
further analysed by looking at speeding behaviour before and after the incentive ran out. 
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Table 6:  Overall change in kilometres, night-time driving and speeding between the five-week before 
and after periods (those who did not make money only) 
n = 41 Before After Change 95% Confidence Interval of the Change 
Percent of 
Sample 
Reducing 
Average 
VKT 
967.6 1208.2 241 (24.9%) 
(p = 0.00) 
214.0 (22%) 
to 267.1 (28%) 
0% 
Night-
time VKT 
76.9 
(7.9%) 
139.9 
(11.6%) 
63.0 (82.0%) 
(p = 0.00) 
43.4 (56%) to 
82.7 (108%) 
24% 
Speeding 
VKT 
133.4 
(13.8%) 
131.1 
(10.9%) 
-2.2 (-1.7%) 
(p = 0.83) 
-12.7 (-9%) to 
8.2 (6%) 
46% 
5.2 Disaggregate comparisons 
While the aggregate level comparisons indicate overall change across the sample, evidently 
there is considerable heterogeneity within the sample as might be anticipated for an experiment 
of this nature. It is also not clear from the evidence thus far as to why people might/might not 
have changed behaviour and to what extent this was due to the financial mechanisms. This 
section of the results takes a more disaggregate approach towards changes in the key 
parameters, namely VKT, speeding and night-time driving by considering both the numerical 
evidence as well as qualitative evidence coming from the exit interviews. 
5.2.1 Vehicle kilometres travelled 
Changes in VKT be participant are shown in Figure 3 – by way of interpretation, those falling to 
the right of the line reduced VKT, while those to the left of the line increased VKT. The picture 
re-enforces the earlier findings that while there is an even split in terms of those 
increasing/decreasing VKT, those decreasing VKT have done so by a substantially larger 
amount. Focusing on the largest reductions in VKT, the participant with the biggest net 
reduction from 2,590 km in the before period to 294 km in the after period clearly aroused the 
suspicion of the research team. Follow-up interviews revealed the participant (who drove a 
considerable distance to work in Western Sydney) had entered into an informal car-pooling 
agreement with a neighbour in which they agreed to use the neighbour’s car for the majority of 
the five week after period and split the difference! The participant with the second largest 
reduction (2,520 km in the before period to 446 km in the after period) explained this was 
largely due to the fact that in the before period the car was shared with her daughter who drove 
a lot for work. During the after period, her daughter purchased her own car and stopped driving 
the participant’s car. Ideally, a second GPS device would have been installed in the daughter’s 
car, but clearly this was not possible. 
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Figure 3:  Changes in VKT in the before and after periods 
While detailed analysis of the exit interviews is currently underway, it is useful to give some 
preliminary sense of changes in personal circumstances that might have affected driving during 
the study period. Ten percent of participants indicated a major change in personal circumstances 
in the before period, 20 percent for the interim period, and 25 percent in the after period. Among 
the reasons provided were giving birth, being hospitalised for some reason, death/serious illness 
in the family, moving house, changing jobs, someone else using the car more (or less). 
Whatever the precise reason, the issue is that even within a relatively short time-period (three 
months), a significant number of participants faced events that impacted driving (arguably) 
above and beyond the imposition of the charging regime. 
To gain more insight on this issue, participants were also asked about whether they reduced 
driving per se by travel purpose to earn financial rewards – the results are shown in Figure 4. In 
terms of work-related travel, over 80 percent of participants said they did not reduce work-
related driving because of the money with the charts suggesting that the incentive needed to be 
substantially higher to see a meaningful change. This does not seem to support what was found 
in the observational data, where there was a substantial reduction in work-related VKT and a 
roughly 50:50 split in terms of those reducing. The results for social/recreational trips are more 
aligned with what was seen in the GPS data, re-enforcing the notion that participants generally 
have more latitude and flexibility to change discretionary travel. The shopping/personal 
business graphs mirrored the social/recreational trends more closely. This supported the 
empirical findings in terms of the proportions reducing shopping/personal business VKT, even 
if there was no net reduction in overall shopping/personal business VKT across the sample. 
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Figure 4:  Exit interview responses to the question “During the charging phase did you reduce a)work-
related driving, b) social/recreational driving, and c) shopping/personal business driving to earn 
financial rewards and to what extent would you reduce them if the reward was increased?” 
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5.2.2 Speeding 
The overall results for speeding, while impressive, necessitate a closer look to establish where 
these reductions are coming from. Figure 5 presents an overall picture of speeding across the 
106 qualifying participants (it should be noted, the highest speeder was recorded at 60 percent, 
but they did not qualify for the intervention for other reasons so are not included here). The 
most pertinent issues to take away are that i) at some point, all participants sped, ii) two-thirds 
of participants sped less than 15 percent of the distance (arguably inadvertent speeding), and iii) 
one-third of participants sped more than 15 percent of the distance driven, indicative of more 
systematic/deliberate speeding behaviour. Clearly, the magnitude of speeding must also be 
factored in, and issue that thus far has only been analysed for the before period (Greaves and 
Ellison, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 5: Overall distance speeding by participant in the before period 
The change in overall speeding by participant is presented in Figure 6 – by way of 
interpretation, those falling to the right of the diagonal line reduced speeding, while those to the 
left increased speeding. In addition to re-enforcing the aggregate comparisons provided earlier, 
it is particularly notable that some of the highest speeders reduced speeding substantially – for 
instance, the highest speeder in the before period at 35 percent, reduced their speeding to 3 
percent in the after period. Overall, only 10 percent of participants now sped more than 15 
percent of the distance driven although it is still concerning that 25 percent of participants 
actually increased their speeds in the charging phase, suggesting no impact of the money or the 
fact they were being monitored. 
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Figure 6:  Changes in speeding in the before and after periods 
Exit interview results asked participants if they reduced speeding to earn financial rewards and 
to what extent increases in the money would have encouraged further reductions in speeding. 
The results (Figure 7) suggest that around half of the participants were heavily influenced by the 
charge (proxied by the response of ‘completely’ or ‘often’). As the incentive increases, clearly 
the influence of the money grows, but it is (arguably) of more interest that there is a ‘hard core’ 
of just over 20 percent of motorists who apparently will not reduce speeding for financial 
reasons. This is similar to what was observed in the empirical data, where 23 percent of 
motorists did not decrease speeding in the after period. 
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Figure 7: Exit interview responses to the question “During the charging phase did you reduce 
speeding to earn financial rewards and to what extent would you reduce speeding if the reward was 
increased?” 
6. Conclusions 
While a number of investigations have been conducted into motorist responses to various types 
of charging regimes, few have focused on driving behaviour per se. This paper reports on the 
behavioural response of motorists to a variable rate charging scheme designed to encourage 
safer driving behaviour and reduce their exposure to crash-risk – specifically kilometres driven, 
night-time driving and speeding. Overall, while participants made money, a substantial 
proportion (39 percent) did not suggesting they were unwilling/unable to change for the 
monetary incentives on offer. Speeding (which was the easiest thing to change) was reduced 
substantially following imposition of the charging scheme although a ‘hard core’ of perennial 
speeders remain. It is not conclusive to what extent this was due to the money or the monitoring, 
but is likely a function of both, judging from exit interviews. VKT was reduced by ten overall, a 
large reduction. However, the sample was equally split on those decreasing/increasing VKT, 
highlighting for many the difficulties involved in reducing car-dependency an assertion again 
corroborated by the exit interviews. 
Clearly, as with any study of this nature, there are caveats relating to the sample size and 
composition, the technology, the regime used etc. However, the crucial issue is that it has been 
demonstrated that it appears possible to significantly change aggregate behaviours (particularly 
speeding) of a segment of the motoring public through financial leverages based on (in effect) 
rewarding better behaviour. Such a notion is being taken up through the previously-discussed 
Pay-How-You-Drive (PHYD) products being increasingly offered through the commercial 
insurance sector. While undoubted challenges remain, GPS technology opens up the possibility 
for developing greater equity in charging systems that reflect not just the kilometres driven but 
when, where and how they are driven. 
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